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DEFECTS IN THE ILLINOIS PROBATE
STATUTES
GEORGE S. STANSELL 1

S URELY one cannot

doubt that the styles in lawmaking shift and vary and are as subject to the perpetual
flux and change of Heraclitus as are the eternal atoms.
Time was when a Hammurabi, a Justinian, or a Napoleon
aspired to synthesize the law into a code of Hegelian prescience, but such an enterprise occurred only once in centuries, and then only under stress of urgent political or
social necessity.
In these times, however, such necessity is no longer
requisite. The tendency to codify and revise everything
susceptible, or believed to be susceptible, of codification
or revision has become absolute and self sustaining. One
is reminded of the saying of Selden,
The Rack is used nowhere as in England. In other countries
it is used in Judicature, when there is semi-plena probatio, a half
proof against a man, then to see if they can make it full, they
rack him to try if he will confess. But here in England, they take
a man and rack him I do not know why, nor when, not in time of
Judicature, but when somebody bids.
The American Law Institute, unofficially, but with tremendous prestige, has undertaken not only to smooth
the waters of so bellicose a subject as Conflict of Laws,
but even to appropriate to its own domain the innocuous
1 Member of Illinois Bar; alumnus of Chicago-Kent College of Law; Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
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solemnity of Contracts and the fidelity of Trusts. Now
we understand that even the unstable law or Real Property is to be put upon a firm foundation.
"Uniform" laws covering Sales, Negotiable Instruments, Marriage Evasion, Bank Collections, and other
subjects too numerous and various to mention have been
promulgated, and adopted by the several legislatures in
somewhat un-uniform form; and construed in even less
uniform manner.
Nor has Illinois escaped the general flood. In addition
to participation in the national movement, the Civil Practice Act has sought to avoid old evils by new forms and
nomenclature. An entirely new criminal code is in the
offing, presenting a delightfully new and different classification of crimes, with rape, burglary, and arson distributed through the various classes. One wonders if
the sympathy erstwhile enjoyed by the criminal may not
soon be well deserved by his attorney. The practice of
law is ever new, ever young, ever changing.
It is submitted, however, that there is a legitimate field
for revision, and proper channels into which the urge to
revise should be guided, and to which it should be confined. This field is the mere physical rearrangement of
statutes, the reconciliation of inconsistencies, the resolution of ambiguities, and the remedying of obvious deficiencies. Such work should be primarily editorial in its
scope. The tendency toward sweeping reform should be
resisted, and the essential integrity of the law preserved.
Certainly such a work might with advantage be performed in the broad field of probate law in Illinois. It is
the proposal of the present writer to consider a few of
the more obvious ambiguities, inconsistencies, and deficiencies of the present Illinois probate statutes with a
view to such possible revision. Since from the very nature of the subject there is no orderly mode of procedure,
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it is proposed simply to select somewhat at random points
from the Illinois statutes dealing with probate, wills,
guardians, dower, descent, etc.
PREFERENCE TO CREDITOR OR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR

One of the most obvious ambiguities occurs in section
18 of the Administration Act, in connection with the
classes of those entitled to be appointed as administrator.
The ninth and last class provides that administration
shall be granted: "To the public administrator or to any
creditor who shall apply for the same." Is preference to
be given to a creditor or to the public administrator?
This question might easily be resolved by removing one
or the other into a tenth class.
Nor has the matter been clarified by judicial opinion.
In the appellate court case of Coffee v. Mann, apparently
in point, preference is given to the public administrator.
Upon careful inspection, however, this case is found to
be one involving the estate of a non-resident, with respect
to which all doubt is removed by express provision in a
subsequent portion of section 18. 8
From section 47, and to a lesser degree from section 51,
we may infer a legislative intent to prefer the creditors.
The former section provides:
Whenever any person dies seized or possessed of any real estate
within this state, or, having any right or interest therein, has no

relative or creditor within this state who will administer upon

such deceased person's estate, it shall be the duty of the county
court, upon application of any person interested therein, to com-

mit the administration of such estate to the public administrator
of the proper county.

This cannot be regarded, however, as in any sense satisfactorily determining the matter.
2 200 Ill. App. 143 (1916).
3 "In all cases where the intestate is a non-resident, and in all cases where
there is no widow, husband or next of kin entitled to a distributive share in
the estate of such intestate, who at the time of the death of said decedent is a
bona fide resident of this State, administration shall be granted to the public
administrator. . ....
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This ambiguity was not present in the earlier acts. In
that of 1872,4 provision is made that,
if no widow or other relative of the intestate applies within sixty
days from the death of the intestate, the County Court may
grant administration to any creditor who shall apply for the
same. If no creditor applies within fifteen days...
provision is made for granting of administration to the
public administrator. This same distinction was preserved in the acts of 1891, 5 and 1897.8
Whether the creditor or the public administrator is to
be given the preference, or whether the court is to have
the power to elect is not with certainty indicated, and
clearly cannot be satisfactorily deduced. How the matter
should be resolved is beyond the purview of this paper;
that it should be resolved one way or the other is obvious.
TIME FOR ELECTION

Section 18, along with section 19, is involved in further
confusion with respect to the appointment of public administrators. Section 18 provides:
Preference and the right to nominate under this act must be
exercised within sixty days from the death of the intestate, at the
expiration of which time administration shall be granted to
the public administrator.
However, section 19 provides that
letters ...

shall not be granted to any person not entitled to the

same as husband, widow, next of kin, creditor or public administrator, within seventy-five days after the death of the intestate,
without satisfactory evidence that the persons having the preference have relinquished their prior right thereto; and if within
said seventy-five days letters of administration of the estate of
a resident intestate have been granted to the public administrator
or a creditor and it shall afterwards appear that there is a
widow or husband or child of such intestate a resident of this
State, the letters granted to such public administrator or cred4Laws of Illinois 1871-72, p. 77, sec. 18.

Laws 1891, p. 1, sec. 1.
6 Laws 1897, p. 1, sec. 1.
5
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itor may be revoked, provided application is made ...

within six

months after the death of such intestate....
The seventy-five day provision tends to render somewhat nugatory the sixty day provision of section 18. In
Dupee v. Follett,7 the Illinois Supreme Court held that
the sixty day proviso was not strictly mandatory, and
that heirs might be granted administration upon application made five months after the death of the intestate,
provided that letters had not been previously granted to
the public administrator.'
Although some of the problems presented have been
solved by the courts, the entire picture is not yet clear,
and there is, at least, a fifteen day twilight zone urgently
demanding legislative clarification.
APPOINTMENTS OF ADMINISTRATORS DE

BoNis NoN

AND

WITH THE WILL ANNEXED

The situation with respect to appointment of successors
after removal, death, or other disqualification or resignation of administrators is considerably confused, but that
with respect to the appointment of administrators with
the will annexed is hopeless. Sections 27 to 39 of the
Administration Act set forth the grounds for removal:
letters obtained through false pretenses, ' production of
will,1" setting aside of will,11 lunacy, disability, mismanagement, 12 removal from state,"3 failure to give further
or other security under certain situations, 4 and death."5
7 304 Ill.
166, 136 N. E. 543 (1922).
8 This decision follows Cotterell v. Coen,
that where the heirs agreed to dispense with
were no debts, there was no authority for
public administrator.
9 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 3, sec.
10 Ibid., sec. 29.
11 Ibid., sec. 30.
12 Ibid., sec. 31.
13 Ibid., sec. 32.
14 Ibid., sec. 33-37.
15 Ibid., sec. 38, 39.

246 Ill. 410 (1910), which held
administration, and where there
granting administration to the
27.
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In all instances except two, provision is made for revocation of letters, but none for appointment of a successor.
In section 37, which provides for the revocation of letters
if the representative, upon being duly notified of the withdrawal of a surety, shall fail to furnish sufficient security, and in section 38, providing for the death of a sole
representative, the statute merely provides that letters
of administration de bonis non or with the will annexed
shall be granted to " some other fit person," or "to some
suitable person" respectively. 6
Section 39 is the crucial one and the one most involved
in doubt and controversy. It provides that,
where the letters of one of several executors or administrators
are revoked, or one or more of the executors or administrators
die or become disqualified after their appointment by the court,
the court shall, on petition of the surviving husband, or wife,
or next of kin of the testator, or if there are none such, then
upon the petition of any of the beneficiaries named in such will,
appoint others in their place .... When all the letters of all of
them are revoked, or all of such executors or administrators die
before final settlement and distribution of the estate, administration, with the will annexed, or de bonis non, shall be granted to
the person next entitled thereto: Provided, That in making any
appointment under this section, the court shall give preference
to the surviving husband, or wife, or next of kin of the deceased,
or beneficiaries named in the will, in the order named.
The order of preference is certainly far from clear.
Perhaps the best interpretation would be that preference is to be in accordance with the original classifications
7
contained in section 18. And in Wilkinson v. Nowers,
the Appellate Court laid down the rule that generally
persons are entitled to administration de bonis non in the
same order as they would have been entitled to an original grant in case of intestacy or to letters with the will
annexed. The last part of section 39 provides that letters
16 In section 41, dealing with resignation, similar provision is made that
letters shall be granted "to some suitable person."
17 217 Ill. App. 314 (1920).
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"shall be granted to the person next entitled thereto,"
which might, upon its face, be thought to refer to section
18. However, there is appended the following proviso,
which indicates clearly that section 18 was not expressly
contemplated:
That in making any appointment under this section, the court
shall give preference to the surviving husband, or wife, or next
of kin of the deceased, or beneficiaries named in the will, in the
order named.
This last demonstrates that testate as well as intestate
estates are contemplated, as is clearly indicated throughout the section as a whole. Section 18, of course, expressly refers to intestate estates only.
Practically the only guide furnished for the appointment is that "the court shall give preference to the surviving husband, or wife, or next of kin." No more definite
rule is furnished for the appointment of administrators
with the will annexed; if anything, the matter is rendered
even more complex by the appendage to those to be given
preference of "or beneficiaries named in the.will, in the
order named."
Just what is the meaning of the words "in the order
named?" Does it mean the "order named" here in the
statute, or the "order named" in the will? If the former,
is it not superfluous ? If the latter, is it not a hopelessly
illogical rule of preference, inasmuch as the beneficiaries
in a will are not often named in the order of importance ?
A will frequently begins with desultory bequests of small
amounts to servants, friends, and the like, to be followed
later by the principal beneficiaries. Is it intended to prefer the former over the latter?
Much of the responsibility for the indefiniteness of the
guide available is the result of a statutory accident. Section 39 was last amended in 1901.18 Until 1905, section 18
Is

Laws 1901, p. 2, sec. 1.
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had been last amended in 1897.19 Under the act as then
amended, section 18 furnished substantially the same
guide as that now indicated in section 39. When, in
1905,20 section 18 was placed in its present form, with the
classifications at present in force, section 39 was not
revised and cobrdinated to section 18.
Nor is this phase of the law uncertain only as to the
order of preference. Equal difficulty prevails with respect to the mode of removal. The mode of procedure in
each instance is little more than suggested, and even as
so suggested differs for each cause of removal.
That the entire matter of revocation of letters and
appointment of administrators de bonis non and with the
will annexed is urgently in need of clarification and revision can scarcely be doubted. This work could unquestionably be effected without change in the substantive
law, and almost purely as an editorial matter.
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE PENDING APPEAL

Who is to administer an estate during appeal from an
order revoking letters? Probably an administrator to
collect, in accordance with the provisions of section 11
providing for the appointment of an administrator to
collect
during any contest in regard to the right of executorship, or to
administer the estate of any person dying either testate or intestate, or whenever any other contingency happens which is
productive of great delay....
This provision would seem to be broad enough. However,
the Illinois Supreme Court held, in Day v. Bullen,21 that
such appointment cannot be made after letters have been
issued to an executor unless the letters are revoked. When
an appeal is pending from an order revoking letters,
have the letters been decisively revoked? It is suggested
19 Laws 1897, p. 1, sec. 1.
20 Laws 1905, p. 2, sec. 1.
21 226 IMI. 72, 80 N. E. 739 (1907).
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that there is sufficient question with respect to this matter to require clarification of the statute.
ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATION

Upon the subject of ancillary administration the statutes are conspicuously silent. Except for section 43, empowering foreign executors and administrators to sue,
section 44, limiting such power to cases where letters
have not issued in this state, section 9 of the Wills Act
relative to filing of authenticated copies of wills probated
outside the state, and sections 29 to 34 of the Wills Actthe so-called Uniform Foreign Probate Act-the statutes
are practically silent with respect to rights and powers of
foreign representatives, and ancillary administrators.
This deficiency has been partially supplied by rules of
some courts, as in the case of Rule 84 of the Probate
Court of Cook County providing for the payment of distributive shares to foreign representatives.
Inasmuch as most questions of ancillary administration and relationships between representatives of different jurisdictions are apt to cause difficulty and confusion,
it is submitted that adequate provision therefor should
be expressly made in the Administration Act.
REPUBLICATION FOR CLAIMS

Another situation in urgent need of clarification is that
relating to the republication for claims. The statute,2
as amended in 1933, after providing that claims not exhibited within one year shall be barred as to inventoried
property, provides that
if the executor or administrator shall thereafter file any inventory listing other estate not previously inventoried or accounted
for, and shall cause notice to be published . . . all claims not ex-

hibited to the court prior to the date so fixed shall be forever
barred as to the property and estate listed in such inventory ....

Whether this provision is intended, as might be inferred
22 111. State Bar Stats. (1935),

Ch. 3, sec. 71.
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from a literal construction of the statute, to apply only
to supplemental inventories, where one has already been
filed within the year, or whether it is intended likewise
to bar claims upon republication where no inventory has
been filed at all within the year, presents a perplexing
question, which, probably because of the recentness of
the provision, has not as yet been sufficiently determined
by judicial decision. A timely clarification by the legislature may well obviate the necessity for any such judicial
determination.
CITATIONq PROCEEDINGS

There are a number of provisions scattered throughout
the probate statutes in a desultory way with respect to
citation-to discover assets, prevent waste, etc.238 Inasmuch as probate proceedings are often from their very
nature actually ex parte, citation proceedings are of especial importance. It is believed that such provisions
should be carefully co6rdinated, and a definite, feasible
procedure for the use of citation machinery outlined in
the statute itself. At present, such proceedings lack
"teeth," and even in the hands of an aggressive court
constitute little more than a feeble threat.
INVESTMl-ENTS BY GUARDIANS AND CONSERVATORS

An interesting situation obtains with respect to the
respective investments of guardians and conservators.
The provisions in the two acts 24 are for the most part substantially identical, but in several respects, apparently
with no better explanation than the vagaries of statutory
growth, different. Both provide for the investment in
United States bonds, F. H. A. debentures, county or city
bonds, and personal loans not to exceed $100.
However, a conservator is permitted to invest the
funds of his ward in the bonds of any state, whereas,
23 Ibid., Ch. 3, sec. 60, 82, 83, 91, 116, 117, 133, 140; Ch. 148, sec. 18.
24 Ibid., Cb. 64, sec. 22; Ch. 86, sec. 18.
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curiously enough, no such investment is permitted the
guardian of a minor. The writer is unable to discover
any basis for the distinction. One must reluctantly assume that it is merely fortuitous.
Another variance is of interest, particularly in view of
its possible implications-that regarding mortgage investments. Loans made by the guardian upon real estate
must be "secured by first mortgage thereon," whereas
those of conservators may be "secured by first mortgage,
or trust deed thereon." Despite the provision contained
in a subsequent section of each act, 25 that "the word
'mortgage' as used in this Act shall include a trust deed
and any instrument in the nature of a mortgage," one
finds it difficult, especially in view of the fact that the
last mentioned is in each instance appended to a section
making provision for the mortgaging of the property of
the ward rather than for the investment of the ward's
funds, to resist the suggestion at least that the failure to
include "trust deed" in the provision with respect to
guardians' investments may have been intended to exclude investments in such, and to have precluded investment in "split-mortgages," while allowing the same in
the case of conservators.
One cannot but note in passing that specific provision
is made with respect to conservators that "all loans
shall be subject to the approval of the court"; whereas
no such provision is contained in the section dealing with
the investments of guardians. It may possibly be implied
from a proviso that loans secured by mortgages may be
"extended from year to year without the approval of the
court," but certainly it is not expressly provided. While
prudence would dictate investment only upon approval
of the court in either case, reason recommends uniformity of provision in the absence of logical distinction.
25

Ibid., Ch. 64, sec. 25; Ch. 86, sec. 21.
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The provision, contained only in the section relating to
guardians' investments, limiting loans upon mortgages
to five years and to the period of minority, is, of course,
based upon such logical distinction.
Upon the whole, no good reason appears why, with the
exception of the last mentioned logical difference, the
provisions for investment of funds by guardians and conservators should not be identical throughout, or even
embodied in one section. The present condition merely
introduces needless confusion, doubt and perplexity into
the law, calling for interpretation and argument where
none should be required.
APPEALs

There are five different provisions for appeal from the
various probate acts, the Administration Act,2 8 the
Guardian and Ward Act,27 the two acts on lunatics, etc.,2 8
and the Wills Act.2 9 Some contain provisions for supersedeas; some, none. One-the Wills Act-makes some
provision with respect to evidence and procedure; the
others, none. The provisions for the giving and approval
of bonds vary generally.
There is practically no suggestion of the actual machinery of appeal, no indication of the procedure to be followed, nor any designation of a model.
It is recommended that these various modes of appeal
from the county or probate court be made uniform, and
that the procedure to be followed be definitely outlined,
or, in the alternative, that the mode of appeal provided
for in the Civil Practice Act be adopted.
THE DOWER ACT

Perhaps the most difficult portion of all the so-called
26

Ibid., Ch. 3, sec. 126, 127.

2T Ibid., Ch. 64, sec. 44.
28

Ibid., Ch. 85, sec. 11; Ch. 86, sec. 41.

29 Ibid., Ch. 148, sec. 15, 16.
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probate statutes is the Dower Act, especially the extremely complex provisions with respect to the property
taken by a surviving spouse "in lieu of dower." 8 The
attitude of the Bar with respect to the Act is most interesting. To be perfectly accurate, it must be said that
there are at least two attitudes toward it. There are those
who flatly contend that the Act is unintelligible and incapable of being comprehended, that an attempt to trace
its treacherous provisions is merely a legal "merry-goround."
There are others, who, while admitting that the provisions are somewhat complex, stoutly contend that the
legislative intent is clear and unavoidable, that while
there is some apparent ambiguity, the means of resolving it is always at hand. One might be more convinced by
the confident assurance of these latter if they were in
agreement among themselves. Unfortunately, they are
not." Even these stalwart defenders are, however, in
substantial agreement that the Act needs attention, and
that little short of general revision will suffice.
Perhaps the situation can be best illustrated by reference to the case of Clark v. Hanson, 2 decided by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1926. The court there held that
a widow may not, upon renunciation of her husband's
will, where the entire estate consists of personalty, share
in that personalty. The contention was made in that case,
and sustained by the court, that the sole rights of a renouncing widow are, under section 12, "in lieu of
dower"; that to hold otherwise would render the statute
unconstitutional as embracing a subject not expressed in
its title, "An Act to Revise the Law in Relation to
Dower." The result, of course, was most inequitable, and
30 Ibid., Ch. 41, sec. 1, 10, 11, 12.
31 Note the articles of Mr. Samuel Fox and Mr. William L. Eagleton,
taking issue, in 26 IH. L. Rev. 145.
32 320 Ill. 480, 151 N. E. 369 (1926).
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certainly could not have been contemplated or intended
by the legislature. 8
In 1927, the Dower Act was amended, unquestionably
to remedy the situation presented the preceding year
in Clark v. Hanson. Whether or not the amendments
accomplished the purpose intended is now a seriously
disputed matter. One may assert with confidence that the
constitutional objection has been obviated by changing
the title to read: "An Act Concerning the Rights in Real
and Personal Property Accruing by Reason of the Marital Relation."
Prior to the amendment of 1927, section 1 merely provided for the abolition of curtesy, and substitution and
definition of dower. The amendment of 1927 added a
provision with respect to personal property, beginning
in the following language:
And except where the deceased spouse died intestate, the surviving husband or wife, in case the deceased spouse died leaving surviving a child or children or descendants of a deceased child or
children, shall also be entitled to one-third of all the personal
property....
Mr. Samuel Fox, in an article in the Illinois Law
Review,84 sustains his primary thesis-that the amendment of 1927 has not accomplished its purpose-by arguing that the use of the initial conjunction "And" in this
clause immediately following the old provision with respect to dower, and especially coupled with the expression "shall also be entitled," is indicative of an intent
that the provision with respect to personalty shall be
available only where there is dower.
This construction, Mr. William L. Eagleton, in an
accompanying note, 5 characterizes as "strained." It
38 One could'picture an extreme situation where the widow might be
permitted to take 50 per cent of a million dollar estate provided there was a
$100 lot in the estate; but nothing where, as in Clark v. Hanson, there was
no realty, or the only realty had been held in joint tenancy.
84 26 Ill. L. Rev. 145.
35 26 Ill. L. Rev. 164.
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must be said that the general opinion of the Bar at the
present time is that the doctrine of Clark v. Hanson has
been eliminated by the amendment of 1927.
The entire Act is immersed in complexity. Under section 10, a share in fee in preference to dower may be
obtained either by electing or by failing to elect. In the
case of a testate estate, the Act allows the spouse four
alternatives: (1) the provision under the will; (2) dower;
(3) the statutory alternative provided in section 10; and
(4) the election in section 12-similar to but not identical
with that in section 10.
If it be said, as can hardly be denied, that the Dower
Act is the most in need of revision, it can with equal truth
and propriety be said that it will offer perhaps the most
difficult task of all the probate statutes. Part of the explanation for its present unsatisfactory condition doubtless lies in the inherent perplexity of its subject matter.
Its revision must be effected with the utmost care, and
only by those who have thoroughly familiarized themselves with all the law upon the subject.
The foregoing represent a few of the more obvious defects of the present probate statutes. If no more were accomplished than their elimination, such revision would
represent a worthy contribution to the statutory law of
the state. There are, however, a number of other respects
in which the form, if not the contents of these statutes
could be improved by proper revision.
Many of the sections are too long, and should be broken
down into smaller ones. This would not only obviate
the burdensome necessity for searching the present formidable expanses of solid type, but would, in and of
itself, tend to eliminate confusion and promote greater
clarity.
It is suggested that, in the interest of simplicity, sim-
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ilar matters be grouped together in the statutes, and
that sections practically identical, unless some basic difference exists, be made identical. This is true, not only
with respect to investments of guardians and conservators,
and procedure for appeal, as above mentioned, but also
of many other matters referring to guardians and conservators, whose duties offer more similarities than differences-certainly of their bonds, as well as of those
of executors and administrators.
It is recommended that definite procedure be indicated
for all phases of probate administration; that where the
Civil Practice Act is to be applicable, it be made so specifically. In addition to the revocation of letters, above
mentioned, the sale and mortgaging of real estate requires such treatment. It might be feasible to group in
one portion of the statutes all provisions for selling and
mortgaging realty, whether by an executor, an administrator, a guardian, or a conservator.
It is submitted that if general statutory revision is ever
justified, as we cannot doubt it sometimes is, the probate
statutes of Illinois certainly offer a most apt subject for
such revision.

